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Abstract 
The paper assesses the effects of increasing competition in the service sector in Italy 
which, based on cross-country comparisons, is the OECD country with the highest markups 
in non-manufacturing industries. We propose a two-region (Italy and the rest of the euro 
area) dynamic general equilibrium model allowing for monopolistic competition in the labor, 
manufacturing and service markets. We then use the model to simulate the macroeconomic 
and spillover effects of increasing the degree of competition in the Italian services sector. 
Our results indicate that reducing the service sector markups to the levels of the rest of the 
euro area increases in the long run Italian GDP by 11 percent and welfare (measured in terms 
of steady state consumption equivalents) by about 3.5 percent. Half of the GDP increase 
would be realized in the first three years. The spillover effects to the rest of the euro area are 
limited. 
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 1 Introduction1
The economic agenda of many European countries includes policies to increase the degree
of competition in product markets. Especially in service sectors, competition is often
limited by regulation, which provides for entry barriers, restrictions on prices, limitations
on the forms of business. Excessive regulation can give ¯rms market power and allows
them to charge high markups over costs, limiting output and material wealth. As recom-
mended by several international economic institutions, increasing competition in markets
is a crucial policy goal.
In this paper we assess the macroeconomic and spillover e®ects of increasing compe-
tition in the service sector in one country of the Euro area. We focus on Italy. Based
on cross country comparisons, Italy stands out as the country with the highest markups
in non manufacturing industries among the OECD countries.2 Italy has also experienced
more than a decade of sluggish growth compared to its main partner countries3, and one
of the leading explanations for this development points to the lack of °exibility in the
services sectors (mainly distribution, utilities and banking), both in absolute and relative
terms.
A large literature has analyzed the e®ects of regulation, especially in service sectors,
on the performance of the regulated sector and found that regulation reduces the level of
output, investment and employment. For example, Alesina et al. (2005) show that reg-
ulatory reforms in sectors which are traditionally sheltered from competition (transport,
communication and energy) have had a signi¯cant positive impact on their investment
levels. Also the e®ect of service regulation on downstream industries, typically manufac-
turing, has been recently stressed. For example, Barone and Cingano (2007) show { using
a large sample of sector and countries { that lower service regulation has non-negligible
1Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations, Forecasting and Modelling Di-
vision. Presented at the CEPR Conference on Globalization, EMU and Reshaping of European
Economies (Florence, June 2007), Bank of Italy (October 2007). We thank Alberto Locarno, Stefano
Siviero and two referees for comments and suggestions. Correspondence: andrea.gerali@bancaditalia.it,
lorenzo.forni@bancaditalia.it, massimiliano.pisani@bancaditalia.it
2For markups estimates for di®erent sectors and countries, see OECD (2005a), OECD (2005b) and
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008). Also, according to the IMF (2007), \...Italy has the most highly
regulated product markets in the EU-15, and various cross-country reviews identify excessive regulation
as a continuing problem in key sectors, accounting also for Italy's undersized services sector and high
energy prices. In part due to these problems, Italy's ranking in cross-country surveys of the business
environment is poor (and worsening). Signi¯cant labor market rigidities (notwithstanding important
progress) also inhibit growth by slowing labor reallocation."
3The GDP average annual growth rate in Italy over the period 1996-2006 is equal to 1:4 percent,
compared to 1:5 in Germany and 2:3 in France. Estimates of the Italian potential output growth have
declined from around 3:6 percent in the early 1970s to about 1:3-1:4 percent currently. Over the same
period the German potential growth rate has decreased from 2:9 to 1:5 percent. In France it has decreased
from 3:0 to 1:8 percent.
5positive e®ects in terms of value added and average labor productivity on sectors that
use services intensively. Overall, these analyses point to relevant e®ects from deregulation
in the service sectors, both on the same sector and on manufacturing production. These
papers, however, don't tackle the issue of the macroeconomic and general equilibrium
e®ects of deregulation, which is the main focus of this paper. Speci¯cally, we develop a
quantitative model of the Italian economy to measure the macroeconomic implications of
greater competition in the Italian services sector.4
We use a two-region currency union model, calibrated to Italy and to the rest of the
Euro area.5 The model is akin to the Global Economy Model (GEM) developed at the
IMF.6 It is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, where we introduce
nontradable goods as a proxy for services and we allow for monopolistic competition in
labor, manufacturing and services markets. Imperfect competition is introduced through
imperfect substitution between varieties, so that monopolistic ¯rms (households in the
case of labor) are able to set a markup over costs (marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor). The lower the degree of substitutability, the higher are markups
and the lower is output (labor supply). Therefore, modifying the parameter governing
the degree of substitutability we can simulate the impact of structural reforms that raise
competition.7 The model also includes real and nominal frictions to match the persistence
usually found in the data as well as a feedback rule for the central bank.
The aim of the paper is to give a quantitative assessment of the macroeconomic impli-
cations of greater competition in key sectors of the Italian economy. It does not address
the issue of which reform strategies would allow to achieve such an increased level of
competition.
We use the model to run several simulations. We ¯rst calibrate the markups to em-
pirically plausible values, using data from manufacturing and service prices in Italy and
the rest of the Euro area. We then investigate the long-run (steady-state) e®ects on the
Italian economy and on the rest of the Euro area of reforms that permanently reduce the
4For an analysis of the implications of enhancing competition and productivity in the Italian services
sector see also OECD (2007).
5The choice of modelling Italy as a part of the Euro area allows to properly take into account the role
of the common monetary policy and the spillovers from (and to) the rest of the area.
6See Bayoumi (2004) and Pesenti (2008) for a description of the GEM. Several central banks have
developed DSGE models for policy anlysis. Among the others, the Fed has developed SIGMA (see Erceg,
Gust and Guerrieri (2006)), the European Central Bank the New Euro Area Wide Model (see Coenen,
McAdam and Straub (2007)).
7In most macroeconomic applications of monopolistic competition it is assumed that there is no entry
or exit of ¯rms, even though pro¯ts are positive, and that the substitution elasticity between goods is
also a measure of competition. However, Ebell and Haefke (2003), for example, show that in many cases
it is equivalent to vary competition by varying the degree of substitution between goods or by varying
the numbers of ¯rms in the industry. More ¯rms means that the number substitutes increases, which
makes each ¯rm's demand more elastic. This is also the approach followed, among others, by Bayoumi,
Laxton and Pesenti (2004), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Everaert and Schule (2006), Jonsson (2007).
6Italian markups in the service sector to the Euro area average level. For each reform sce-
nario we compute the new steady state of macroeconomic variables as well as the welfare
gains that accrue to the reforming country, both including and excluding short-run gains
coming from the transition phase. To check our results for the service sectors, we com-
pare them with alternative scenarios in which reforms foster competition only in the labor
markets, or in both the labor and the service sectors simultaneously. We also compute
the e®ects of synchronized reforms in Italy and in the rest of the Euro area. We do not
limit the analysis to the long run, but also study the adjustments from one steady state
to the other. Finally, we perform several robustness checks varying key preference and
technology parameters.
We ¯nd the following results. First, reforms in services markets have sizable long-run
e®ects on output: the reduction of (gross) markup on services prices to the level prevailing
in the rest of the Euro area (i.e. from 1:61 to 1:35; the reader is referred to section 2.2 below
for a description on how we calibrate mark-up) allows a permanent increase in Italian GDP
of 10:8 percent and an increase in welfare (measured in consumption equivalent units) of
about 3:5 percent.8 For comparison, a similar reform in the labor market is worth 9:1
percent of GDP and above 2 percent in terms of welfare. Second, the spillovers to the
rest of the Euro area of such reforms are modest, given that the rest of the Euro area
is a relatively closed economy.9 Third, when both reforms are jointly implemented, the
e®ects are essentially additive (for example, GDP increases by roughly 21 percent in the
long-run). Fourth, looking at the transition dynamics, while the labor supply rises fairly
quickly after both reforms, the behavior of real wages is di®erent: they rise gradually
after a service sector reform, while dropping rapidly, although by a smaller amount, after
a labor market reform. Fifth, and consequently, the main policy implication from these
results is that a joint implementation of both reforms is likely to soften the negative e®ect
on real wage associated with a labor market reform. This policy prescription resembles
a point made by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), who argue in favor of starting reforms
with product market deregulation in order to raise employment and real wages and thus
lower resistance to subsequent labor market reforms. Finally, experiments varying the
value of key parameters indicate that the quantitative estimated impact of reforms on the
Italian economy is relatively robust.
8When we modify the parameter of markup in the service sector, we keep all other parameters un-
changed. As pointed out above there is an empirical literature (Barone and Cingano (2007) among the
others) on the e®ects of liberalizations that has shown how more competition in the service sectors can
increase productivity. Such an e®ect, which our model does not capture, would reinforce and augment
our quantitative results.
9Similar results were obtained by Everaert and Schule (2008), who conduct a similar experiment for
France and Belgium relative to the rest of the Euro area. Jonsson (2007) analyzes the welfare costs of
imperfect competition in the US using a similar model, although in closed economy; he shows also how
these costs increase markedly once one takes into account the presence of distortionary taxation.
7The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides a brief description of model,
the calibration and the simulated scenarios. Section three presents the results of increasing
competition in labor and services markets, both in terms of steady state e®ects and
transition dynamics. Section four provide sensitivity analysis and section ¯ve concludes.
2 The model
In this section we brie°y illustrate the model setup, the calibration and the simulation
exercises.10
2.1 The setup
We use a simpli¯ed version of the Italian and Euro area Economy Model (IdEA), a
medium-scale new-keynesian model of the Italy's economy developed at the Bank of Italy
Research Department and incorporating economic linkages with the rest of the Euro area.
The model merges microeconomic foundations with nominal price and wage rigidities,
trade and international ¯nancial markets. Hence, it is well-suited to analyze the domestic
and international impact of structural changes due to changes in the degree of competition.
There are two regions, Italy and rest of the Euro area, having di®erent sizes and sharing
the currency and the central bank. In each region there are households and ¯rms. Each
household consumes a ¯nal composite good made of nontradable, domestic tradable and
imported intermediate goods from the rest of the area. Households have access to ¯nancial
markets and smooth consumption by trading a short-term nominal riskless bond. They
also own domestic ¯rms and capital stock, which is rented to domestic ¯rms in a perfectly
competitive market. Households supply di®erentiated labor services to domestic ¯rms
and act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive markets by charging a markup
over their marginal rate of substitution.
On the production side, there are perfectly competitive ¯rms that produce the ¯nal
goods and monopolistic ¯rms that produce the intermediate goods. The three ¯nal goods
(a private consumption, a private investment and a public consumption good) are pro-
duced combining all available intermediate goods in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution
matter. Tradable and nontradable intermediate goods are produced combining capital and
labor in the same way. Tradable intermediate goods are split in domestically-consumed
and export goods. Because intermediate goods are di®erentiated, ¯rms have market power
and restrict output to create excess pro¯ts. We assume that Italy and rest of the Euro
10The main equations are reported in the Appendix.
8area are segmented markets and the law of one price for tradables does not hold.11 Hence,
each ¯rm producing a tradable good sets two prices, one for the domestic market and the
other for the export market. Since the ¯rm faces the same marginal costs regardless of the
scale of production in each market, the di®erent price-setting problems are independent
of each other.
We introduce public expenditure in the model for calibration purposes, as government
consumption is part of overall domestic demand. We assume that the ¯scal authority
consumes ¯nal nontraded goods, ¯nanced through lump-sum exogenous taxes. Hence,
in each period the public sector budget constraint is balanced and public expenditure is
constant.
To capture the empirical persistence of the aggregate data and generate realistic dy-
namics, we include adjustment costs on real and nominal variables, ensuring that, in
response to a shock, consumption and production do not immediately jump to a new
long-term equilibrium. On the real side, we assume habit in consumption and quadratic
adjustment cost on investment change. On the nominal side, quadratic costs (Rotemberg
(1982)) make wage and prices sticky; wages and prices are indexed to previous period
corresponding sector-speci¯c in°ation rate.12
Imperfect competition in product and labor markets is re°ected in markups over
marginal costs. The elasticity of substitution between products of di®erent ¯rms de-
termines the market power of each pro¯t-maximizing ¯rm. The setup in the labor market
is similar. Each worker o®ers a di®erentiated kind of labor services that is an imperfect
substitute for services o®ered by other workers. The lower the degree of substitutability,
for example because of skill di®erences or anti-competitive regulation, the higher is the
markup and the lower employment in terms of hours. Hence, markups are modeled by a
single parameter that can be appropriately modi¯ed to simulate the impact of structural
reforms raising competition in product and labor markets.
2.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model on a quarterly basis to match steady-state great ratios and con-
sistently with the existing DSGE modeling literature on the Euro area.13 In particular,
11Fabiani et al. (2005) provide some empirical support for pricing-to-market in the Euro Area.
12We have experimented introducing also a share (35 percent of the population in each region) of
liquidity constrained agents. These have been modeled assuming they consume their current disposable
income and take as given the wage rate in the labor market, as in Forni, Monteforte and Sessa (2008).
Under these assumptions, the long run e®ects are hardly a®ected. The short run dynamics is slightly
ampli¯ed, but the e®ects are small.
13Speci¯cally, we set parameters to values in the range used to calibrate the Euro area block of IMF's
GEM model. See Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004), Batini, N'Diaye and Rebucci (2005), Cova et al.
9given the focus of this paper, we try to match the share of value added produced in the
nontradable sector. We assume that the services produced in the following sectors are
largely nontradable: retail, transports and communications, ¯nance, insurance, construc-
tion, electricity, gas, water, hotels and restaurants. We do not include services produced
by the public administration, as we model market services. Based on National Account
data on value added by sector in Italy and in the Euro area, nontradable goods are about
50 percent of GDP. This number is in line with the value computed by Stockman and
Tesar (1995) for the US and it is consistent with the values of the utility weight of non-
tradable goods used by Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) in order to match a share
of nontradables in the US consumption basket of 53 percent (average over the period
1967-2002).
In Table 1 we report values of markups for Italy and the rest of the Euro Area.
The markups for tradables (nontradables) in Italy and in the rest of the Euro area were
computed on the basis of estimated markups in the manufacturing (service) sector as
reported in OECD (2005a, 2005b).14 In general, although there is some heterogeneity
among di®erent service sectors, markups in services tend to be uniformly higher that in
manufacturing. On the other hand, we were not able to ¯nd data on Italian and rest of the
Euro area wage markups. Hence, mainly for symmetry, we calibrated it to the same level
as for the service sector; we will perform robustness on this parameter in the robustness
section. The numbers in the Table are gross markups over marginal costs and are related
to the demand elasticity parameter µ by the following steady state relationship for goods
and services:
Price = markup ¤ marginal cost or p = µ=(µ ¡ 1) ¤ mc
and, for wages,
wage = markup ¤ marg: rate of subst: or w = µW=(µW ¡ 1) ¤ ¸
¡1L
¿¡1
where L represents labor hours and ¸ the marginal utility of consumption. For example
the value of 1:61 reported in the Table for the Italian nontradables markup means that
in the service sector prices are on average 61 percent higher that their \perfect compe-
(2008), Everaert and Schule (2008), Cova, Pisani and Rebucci (2009).
14Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) have recently produced new estimates of sectorial markups
using the EUKLEMS data set. On the average of their sample period (1981-2004) theirs estimated values
are in line for the Manufacturing & Construction aggregate (1:18 and 1:23 in the Euro area and Italy,
respectively), while substantially higher for the Market Services sector (1:56 and 1:87, respectively in the
Euro area and Italy). In our baseline calibration we use the more conservative values (1:35 and 1:61,
respectively in the Euro area and Italy) estimated by the OECD. As the percentage reductions in markup
(when moving from the Italian level to the Euro area one) are similar for both estimates, results would
not be substantially di®erent if we had used these more extreme values.
10tition" counterparts. Looking at the Table, we see that in each region markups in the
manufacturing sector are lower than in the services and labor markets. Moreover, Italian
markups in the labor and services sectors are higher than their Euro area counterparts,
by approximately 25 percentage points. In Table 2 we report other parameters. Discount
factors and elasticities of substitution have the same value across the two regions. The
discount factor ¯ is set to 0:9926, so that the steady state annualized real interest rate
is equal to 3:0 percent.15 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1=¾, is set to 1;
the habit parameter, h, to 0:7. The parameter ¿; (1=(¿ ¡1) is the labor Frisch elasticity)
is set to 1:5. The depreciation rate of capital is set to 0:025. The elasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labor is set to 0:92 in the production functions of tradables
and nontradables. The biases toward capital in the production functions are set to match
the private investment-to-GDP ratios. In the ¯nal consumption and investment compos-
ite baskets, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported tradables is set
to 1:5, while the elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables to 0:5 as
it is standard in the GEM calibration. As these elasticities are crucial for cross-region
spillovers of the structural reforms, we also conduct sensitivity tests with respect to these
parameters. The bias for the Italian-produced (vis µ a vis rest of Euro area) tradable good
and that for tradable (vis µ a vis nontradable) goods are chosen to match the bilateral
(Italy-Euro area) import and export shares to GDP. The size of the Italian population
is set to 0:17. We set to the same value the number of Italian ¯rms operating in each
of the two intermediate sectors. Table 3 contains parameters that a®ect the dynamics.
Quadratic adjustment costs on investment change are set to 4:5. The adjustment costs
on prices and wages are set to levels that imply, at the pre-reforms values of markups
parameters, an average frequency of price and wage adjustment equal to seven quarters.
We have chosen this value to get responses to a monetary policy shock similar to those
obtained in GEM. In the sensitivity analysis we consider the e®ect of lowering the degree
of nominal rigidities. The parameter regulating the degree of indexation to the previous
period sector-speci¯c in°ation is set to 0:5 for both wages and prices.
Parameterization of systematic feedback rule followed by the monetary authority is
reported in Table 4. The short term nominal interest reacts to its value in the previous
period, the Euro area-wide CPI in°ation rate and GDP growth rate.16 We have experi-
mented also with a Taylor rule targeting one year ahead yearly in°ation and output gap.
The modi¯cation does not change in any signi¯cant way the results.
Table 5 reports the model-based and actual steady-state great ratios. Given the chosen
15For simplicity we assume that in steady state the gross CPI in°ation rate is one, there is no technology
trend and the net asset position of Italy agains the rest of the Euro area is zero.
16The Euro Area-wide CPI in°ation rate is a weighted (by the size of each region) geometric average
of regional in°ation rates. The Euro Area-wide GDP is the sum of regional GDPs, both denominated in
terms of Italian consumption.
11calibration, the private consumption-to-GDP ratio is 59 percent in Italy (57 percent in
the rest of the area), in line with the data, which are averages from national accounts
statistics over the period 1999-2006. Investment-to-GDP ratios are respectively 21 and
23 percent in Italy and in the rest of the area (21 percent in the data). Italian bilateral
imports and export with the rest of the Euro area are both set, as a ratio to the Italian
GDP, to 26 percent of Italian GDP (26 percent, for both °ows, in the data). Public
consumption expenditure share (which is exogenously given) is set equal to 20 percent in
Italy and in the Euro area, essentially as in the data.
2.3 Scenarios
We consider fully credible and fully anticipated reforms. The way the reform scenario is
implemented follows substantially Everaert and Schule (2008): we assume it is announced
at time one and phased in gradually over ¯ve years. We compare reductions in the
markups of several sizes.
The reforms are evaluated along two dimensions. First, we look at the long-run e®ects,
by comparing steady state equilibria that di®er in terms of markup values. Next, we study
the transitional dynamics from one long-run equilibrium to the other.
We also report two measures of welfare: the ¯rst one (steady state) is simply a com-
parison of the level of utility in the pre-reform and after-reform steady states. The second
one expresses utility in present discounted value terms (using the agents' discount factor)
and includes also the transition phase to the new steady state; it is computed in life-
time consumption equivalent units, i.e. as the constant percentage change x of the initial
steady state level of consumption that would deliver the same utility as the one achieved









In this section we report the results of the scenarios we simulated. We start by showing the
long-run macroeconomic implications of the reforms. Next, we comment on the transition
dynamics from one long run equilibrium to the other.
17Following Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004), when we compute consumer welfare we abstracts
from habit persistence in consumption.
123.1 Long-run e®ects
In what follow we describe the domestic and spillover e®ects of greater competition in
Italian services. As a check we also present results for similar simulations regarding the
labor market. We initially consider increasing competition separately in each market. We
then compare these outcomes with those of increasing competition simultaneously in both
markets in Italy, and simultaneously in both regions.18
The impact of changing services sector markups on the long-run (steady-state) levels
of economic activity are shown in Table 6. We show the percent changes of main variables
when the markup is reduced from its actual estimated value (1:61, as reported in Table
1) to one of the values reported in the ¯rst row of the Table. All other parameters are
set to their baseline values. A lower markup implies an increase in domestic GDP and
consumption. As a reference point, consider the third column of Table 6, corresponding
to the case of a reduction of the Italian markup to the level prevailing in the Euro area
(1:35). The increase in GDP, consumption and investment are respectively equal to 10:8,
7:7 and 18:2 percent. Hours worked also increase, by 7:9 percent. The rise in the capital
stock triggers higher real wages, that increase by 11:9 percent as labor becomes relatively
scarce. So the e®ects of the reform are substantial in this scenario, mainly because the
starting level of competition of the Italian economy is particularly low, and thus the reform
implies a sizeable 40 percent markup reduction. A decrease of the markup to a level even
lower than that prevailing in the Euro area (1:25) would produce an even bigger increase
of GDP equal to 15:7 percent, with consumption and investment increasing, respectively,
by 11:1 and 27:1 percent.
International spillover are due to changes in the amount of exports and imports and
in relative prices. The excess supply in the Italian services sector induces a depreciation
of the Italian real exchange rate. The implied e®ects are two. Italian tradables become
cheaper and the purchasing power of foreign households increases. Both e®ects favour
an increase in Italian exports.19 Italian imports increase because of higher domestic
demand, notwithstanding the worsening of the Italian terms of trade. The terms of
trade deterioration is lower than the real exchange rate depreciation. The reason is that
18In this section each reform acts independently from the other in the sense that, even when both are
implemented at the same time, the model does not have a role for interaction e®ects. For an empirical
assessment of the importance of such e®ects see Jean and Nicoletti (2002).
19The Italian real exchange rate (RER) is de¯ned as the ratio of the Euro area CPI to that of Italy.
Hence, an increase corresponds to a depreciation. The Italian terms of trade (TOT) are de¯ned as the





Hence a depreciation in the Italian real exchange rate favors, to some extent, a deterioration of the Italian
terms of trade.
13the increase in the price of Italian tradables partially counterbalances the real exchange
rate depreciation. The increase in the price of Italian tradables (expressed in Italian
consumption units) has two sources. First, tradables and services are complement, hence
higher demand of the latter drives up demand of the former. Second, higher demand
of Italian inputs (labor and capital) drives up marginal cost also in the manufacturing
sector, that is not subject to any markup-reducing reform.
Overall, the increases in GDP, consumption, investment and labor hours in the rest
of the Euro area are relatively small, which is to be expected on account of the relatively
small degree of openness of the rest of the euro area.
For comparison, Table 7 reports results from a scenario where the reforms only impact
on the labor markets. More speci¯cally, the Italian wage markup is reduced by the
same amount as in the case of the services sector reform. The e®ects on Italian GDP,
consumption, investment and welfare are still substantial, although slightly lower than
those obtained from a similar reduction in the services markup. In particular, when
Italian wage markups are reduced to the Euro area level (1:35), GDP increases by 9:1
percent, while consumption, investment and labor hours increase respectively by 8:9,
9:5 and 12:4 percent. The result depends on the share of labor and the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital in the production function. In the sensitivity
analysis we show that the e®ect on GDP when implementing service sector reforms can
become slightly lower.
The terms of trade deterioration is now stronger than the real exchange rate depreci-
ation because higher labor supply stimulates, di®erently from the case of reforms in the
services sector, also the supply of Italian tradables. Net exports now increase to a higher
extent (compared to the case of reforms in the services sector)
We now consider the case of simultaneously decreasing markups in Italian labor and
services markets (Table 8, third column) to a level equal to 1:35. The main insight from
this exercise is that the long-run gains from implementing both reforms are essentially
equal to the sum of the e®ects from each individual reform. GDP increases by 20:8
percent, consumption and investment respectively by 17:3 and 29:4 percent, while hours
worked by 21:2 percent. All these increases are only slightly higher then those obtained
when reforms are separately implemented. This scenario is also useful to answer another
question. What happens in the labor markets, given that in this scenario the e®ects on
real wages of the two reforms tend to o®set each other? The overall e®ect on real wages
is an increase of 8:5 percent in the long run (slightly below the simple sum of the two
separate e®ects) and hence the positive (and bigger) impact from the service reform more
than o®sets the negative one coming from the labor market reform. This result might be
connected to a general point about the \optimal" timing of reforms made by Blanchard
14and Giavazzi's (2003), who argue that structural reforms should generally start from the
service sector because the ensuing increase in real wages helps to generate support for
subsequent reforms in the labor market (which instead are going to decrease the real
wages). Our simulations suggest that the two reforms, when implemented at exact the
same time, imply that real wages increase overall, although along the transition they
initially drop since the service reform leads to a slightly delayed increase in real wages.20
Obviously, the two reforms together imply stronger movements in international relative
prices (the real exchange rate and terms of trade deteriorate), exported and imported
volumes (that increase) and spillovers (GDP, consumption and investment increase in the
rest of the Euro area).
Finally, we consider the case of permanently and simultaneously reducing markups not
only in Italy, but also in the rest of the Euro area. This scenario sheds light on the e®ect of
movements in international prices in the baseline case. Remember that, when a reform is
implemented in one country, the relative abundance of its products increases and therefore
international relative prices tend to move against the reforming country. This e®ect tend
to disappear when both regions are undergoing the structural reforms at the same time. In
the fourth to sixth columns of Table 8 we consider the case in which markups are reduced
also in the rest of the euro area from 1:35 to 1:25. Terms of trade and real exchange rate
still deteriorate (essentially because the size of the reform in the Euro area is smaller),
but to a lower extent. The smaller real exchange rate depreciation (compared to the
benchmark) has a positive income e®ect on Italian households and stimulates GDP (that
increases by 23:7 percent in the scenario where markups are reduced both in services and
labor markets), consumption and investment (that increase respectively by 20:2 and 32:3
percent). Also, the welfare gains for Italy when the rest of the Euro area is joining into
the reform e®ort are signi¯cantly superior to the ones in the benchmark case. In the case
of both reforms in both regions (Table 8, sixth column), the labor market is again the
place where the combined e®ects are more interesting. Now hours worked in Italy increase
but the extra e®ect coming from reforms in the Euro area is zero, because now Italian
households substitute imported for domestic goods, whose supply strongly increases. The
increase in Italian export is also relatively small, because households in the rest of the
Euro area have a smaller incentive, given the less favorable movement in international
relative prices, to substitute Italian goods for domestic ones.
20It follows that, if the service reforms were allowed to start earlier, as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
suggest, a scenario could be implemented in which real wages raise not only in the ¯nal outcome, but
also all along the transition path.
153.2 Transition dynamics
In this section we look at the transitional dynamics from one long-run equilibrium to the
other. As said above, we run perfect-foresight simulations in which a fully credible (and
fully anticipated) reform is implemented starting from the beginning of the simulation
via a gradual (over a ¯ve year horizon) and permanent reduction in the correspondent
markup. We then study the adjustment paths of endogenous variables towards their
new steady state level. Variables do not jump immediately to the new steady state for
two reasons. First, reforms are gradually implemented. Second, habit in consumption,
adjustment costs on investment, prices and wages, introduced to get a realistic dynamics,
slow the adjustment.
Figures 1a and 1b report the transition dynamics when the Italian services markup
is reduced to Euro area level gradually over ¯ve years. Time is in quarters and variables
are expressed as percentage deviations with respect to the pre-reform steady state values.
Reforms in the services sector imply that most of the long run change in GDP and invest-
ment takes place in the ¯rst twenty quarters while, in the same time span, consumption
variation is equal to 25 percent of its long run change. Consumption drops on impact for
two reasons. First, there is an increase in the real interest rate (see Figure 1b), in turn
due to the fall in in°ation in the presence of slightly higher nominal rate at the euro area
level. Second, lower consumption allows to make room for accumulating capital, so to
maximize the foreseen higher future positive e®ects of reforms on output. Employment
and investment increase gradually over time.
Production in the services sector rises signi¯cantly, accompanied by a sizable fall in
the price of services relative to the one of domestic composite (domestic and imported)
tradables. The real marginal cost in the services sector also increases, because of the
increase in both real wages and the rental rate of capital (the latter, not shown in the
Figures, starts dropping after about twenty quarters, contributing to the °attening of the
marginal cost). The drop in service prices leads to an increase in import prices relative to
the CPI (the weight of services in the consumption bundle is relatively high). The Italian
real exchange rate and the terms of trade deteriorate. Italian export quantities increase
more than imports do, given the depreciation of the Italian real exchange rate and the
related shift of the Euro area demand.
The transitional dynamics for the case of a reduction in the labor markup are shown
in Figures 2a and 2b. Also in this case most of the e®ects of the reforms seem to accrue
in the ¯rst twenty quarters. Real wages drop severely during this initial period (to a level
below their new steady state) and then slowly rise. Meanwhile employment increases
accordingly. Investment, production and consumption rise substantially (between 30 and
1640 percent of the long-run increase in the ¯rst ten quarters). The latter, di®erently from
the case of services reform, always increases because the increase in Italian real interest
rate is now much lower. The relative price of services vs. tradables drops, mainly due to
the higher share of labor input in the service sector as compared to the tradable sector
together with the decrease in real wages. The terms of trade and the real exchange rate
deteriorate, given the higher availability of Italian tradable and nontradable goods. Given
the behavior of Italian international relative prices, reforms in the Italian labor market
imply that Italian exported quantities increase more than imported ones, as in the case
of the services sector reform.
4 Sensitivity analysis
We now investigate the robustness of our long-run results against changes in the values
of key parameters. We ¯rst report results from increasing the competition in the service
sector assuming a value for the markup in the labor market lower than in the baseline. We
then consider changes in some important parameters. Finally, we perform some robustness
exercises on the parameters of price and wage rigidities, that contribute to determine the
speed of adjustment toward the new steady state.
In the baseline simulation we have assumed a wage markup of 1:61, mainly for symme-
try with the value calibrated for the service markup, as we were not able to ¯nd reliable
estimates for this parameter. Table 9 shows the results assuming a wage markup equal
to 1:35. The results are only marginally di®erent for all the variables but for the welfare
level. When wages markups are lower, the welfare from increasing competition in the
service sector increases by a smaller amount, as the starting level of utility is higher.
Tables 10 and 11 report results of reducing the markup in the service sector (Table
10) and in the labor market (Table 11) to 1:35 by moving one parameter at a time in
both regions. The elasticity of intratemporal substitution between domestic and imported
tradable goods (Á) is changed from 1:5 to 3; the elasticity of substitution between tradable
on nontradable goods (½) from 0:5 to 1:1; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1=¾)
from 1 to 2; the parameter of the labor Frisch elasticity (¿) from 1:5 to 3; the elasticity
of substitution between labor and capital (») from 0:92 to 0:8; the capital weight in the
production function (®) from 0:45 to 0:2 in the nontradables sectors and from 0:5 to 0:2
in the tradable sectors. Finally, the relative size of Italy (s) is increased from 0:17 to 0:5.
Compared to the baseline case, the main e®ect of the higher substitutability between
domestic and imported tradable goods is to induce, for a given reduction of price or wage
markup, a stronger increase in Italian GDP and consumption and a lower depreciation of
17real exchange rate and terms of trade. Higher Italian demand implies a stronger increase in
volume imports while exported quantities, because of the smaller deterioration of terms
of trade, increase by a lower extent. Spillover to the rest of the Euro area decrease -
increase in GDP, consumption, investment are lower - given the lower increase in Italian
real exchange rate and terms of trade.
Increasing the elasticity of substitution between tradable on nontradable goods has
signi¯cant e®ects in case of a reduction in nontradable sector markups. The higher sub-
stitution induces a decrease in demand of tradable goods, reducing the needs to increase
capital and labor supply at the economy-wide level. Hence the overall e®ect on GDP is
reduced. Changes in markups in the labor market on the other hand have similar e®ect
both on tradable and nontradable sectors and therefore results are not particularly sensi-
tive to changes in the elasticity of substitution between the two. Spillovers are lower than
in the benchmark, given the lower deterioration in Italian relative prices.
Higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution increases, through the labor supply
schedule, the response of hours worked, favouring a stronger response of all variables for
reduction in markups both in the nontradable sector and in the labor market. GDP
and consumption now reach a level 40 percent higher than in the baseline; there is a
relatively higher response of investment compared to hours when competition increases
in services, while hours increase in line with investment when reforms involve the labor
market. Spillovers are now stronger, given the higher depreciation of Italian real exchange
rate
Compared to the baseline case, a less elastic labor supply decreases the impact of
changes in the wage or services markup on both domestic and foreign variables. Both
quantities and relative prices increase less than in the baseline case, with the exception
of real wages when markups are changed in the service sector.
Reducing the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in both Italy and
the rest of the Euro area, in the case of services sector deregulation, limits the increase in
services supply and hence, in equilibrium, the increase in consumption, investment, labor
hours and real wage is reduced. As a consequence also the real GDP increase is lower. The
real exchange rate and the terms of trade depreciate less than in the baseline and spillovers
to the rest of the Euro area are smaller. In the case of labor market liberalization, the
labor supply increase is the same under the two alternative values of the elasticity, while
the decrease in the real wage is reduced. The stronger complementarity between labor
and capital favours now a stronger increase in investment and hence capital accumulation.
GDP and consumption increases are also higher. The stronger increase in supply favours
a higher deterioration of terms of trade and real exchange rate. In the rest of the area
aggregate quantities and real wage increase less in the low elasticity case, given that the
18stronger deterioration of the Italian terms of trade favours a shift of world demand towards
the Italian tradable goods.
As for the size of the country, domestic variables are not very sensitive to changes in
this dimension (as the spillover e®ects in our baseline simulation are limited); however,
the spillovers are now more signi¯cant.
These results suggest that changing key parameters in the model generally does not
alter the qualitative message emerging from the base-case scenario, and in particular the
size of domestic and cross-region e®ects of changes in competition in the Italian economy,
given that changes in markups have a ¯rst-order e®ect which tends to dominate.
Finally, we performed some robustness check with respect to the parameters of wage
and price stickiness. In the baseline simulation we set to seven quarters the frequency of
price adjustment in the three markets (tradables, nontradables and wages). Setting these
parameters to di®erent levels alters only the speed of adjustment toward the new steady
state. If we set all prices and wage rigidities such that the frequency of adjustments is
about one year, about 70 percent of the e®ects on GDP would be realized in the ¯rst two
years (instead of about 25 percent in the baseline).
5 Conclusions
We have developed and simulated a DSGE model of Italian economy to quantitatively
address the macroeconomic implications of competitive-enhancing reforms in the Italian
services sector. Our simulations produce plausible e®ects of structural polices aimed at
improving competition. Changes in services (and wage) markups signi¯cantly a®ect the
economy. The long run spillover e®ects of reforms to the rest of the Euro area are limited
because the increase in the Italian potential output is matched almost one to one in the
long run by rises in domestic demand and because the rest of the Euro area is a relatively
closed economy.
Bene¯ts are relatively stronger when there are concurrent reforms in both labor and
services markets. There is also a qualitative di®erence between implementing the reforms
in isolation or jointly, given the di®erent response of real wages and labor supply to
the di®erent reforms. Hence, reforms in the services sector can be used to generate
support for labor market reform, a point recently emphasized by Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003). Synchronization of reforms between Italy and the euro area would add further
bene¯ts to the Italian economy, stimulating production while at the same time limiting
the deterioration of international relative prices.
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21Appendix
In what follows we illustrate the Home economy (Italy). The structure of the Foreign
economy (the rest of the Euro area) is similar and to save on space we do not report it.
A1. Final consumption and investment goods
There is continuum of symmetric Home ¯rms producing Home ¯nal nontradable con-
sumption under perfect competition. Each ¯rm producing the consumption good is in-
dexed by x 2 (0;s], where the parameter 0 < s < 1 is a measure of country size. Foreign
¯rms producing the Foreign ¯nal consumption goods are indexed by by x¤ 2 (s;1] (the




































where QH, QF and QN are bundles of respectively Home tradable, Foreign tradable and
Home nontradable intermediate goods, Á > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between
tradables and ½ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable
goods. The parameter aH (0 < aH < 1) is the weight of domestic tradable, aT (0 < aT <
1) is the weight of tradable goods.
The production of investment good is similar. There are symmetric Home ¯rms under
perfect competition indexed by y 2 (0;s], and symmetric Foreign ¯rms by y¤ 2 (s;1].







































Bundles used to produce the ¯nal consumption goods are CES indexes of di®erentiated






































where ¯rms in the Home tradable and nontradable intermediate sectors and in the Foreign
intermediate tradable sector are respectively indexed by h 2 (0;s), n 2 (0;s), f 2 (s;1].
Parameters µT, µN > 1 are respectively the elasticity of substitution between brands in
the tradable and nontradable sector. The prices of the nontradable intermediate goods
are denoted p(n). Each ¯rm x takes these prices as given when minimizing production



















We can derive QA (h;x), QA (f;x), GA (h;x), GA (f;x), PH and PF in a similar way.
Firms y producing the ¯nal investment goods have similar demand curves. Aggregating














(QNA;t + QNE;t + GN;t)
(7)
where GN is nontradable component of the public sector consumption. Home demands
for Home and Foreign tradable intermediate goods can be derived in a similar way.
Supply

















Firm n uses labor LN (n) and capital KN (n) with constant elasticity of input substitution
»N > 0 and capital weight 0 < ®N < 1. Firms producing intermediate goods take the
prices of labor inputs and capital as given. Denoting W the nominal wage index and RK
23the nominal rental price of capital, cost minimization implies:






























The productions of each Home tradable good, T S (h), is similarly characterized.
Price setting in the intermediate sector
Consider now pro¯t maximization in the Home country's nontradable intermediate
sector. Each ¯rm n sets the price pt(n) by maximizing the present discounted value of
















paid in unit of sectorial product QN;t and where ·
p
N measures the degree of price stickiness
while 0 · indN · 1 is the degree of price indexation to previous period sector-speci¯c









where mct (n) is the real marginal cost and A(n) contains terms related to the presence
of price adjustment costs. The above equations clarify the link between imperfect com-
petition and nominal rigidities. As emphasized by Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004),
when the elasticity of substitution µN is very large and hence the competition in the sec-
tor is high, prices closely follow marginal costs, even though adjustment costs are large.
To the contrary, it may be optimal to maintain stable prices and accommodate changes
in demand through supply adjustments when the average markup over marginal costs is
relatively high. If prices were °exible, optimal pricing would collapse to the standard





We simulate structural reforms in the services sector by permanently changing the value
of µN (nontradables are considered as proxy of services). Greater competition and lower
long-run (steady-state) markup correspond to permanently higher values of µN. A similar
24strategy, as illustrated below, is adopted to implement the labor market reforms.
Firms operating in the intermediate tradable sector solve a similar problem. We
assume that there is market segmentation. Hence the ¯rm producing the brand h chooses
pt (h) in the Home market and p¤
t (h) in the Foreign market as to maximize the expected








¿ (h)rer¿ ¡ mcH;¿ (h)(y¿ (h) + y
¤
¿ (h))]
subject to quadratic price adjustment costs similar to those considered for nontradables
and standard demand constraints. The term Et denotes the expectation operator condi-
tional on the information set at time t, ¤t;¿ is the appropriate discount rate and mcH (h)
is the marginal cost. The term rer is the Italian real exchange rate, de¯ned as the Euro
























T is the elasticity of substitution of tradable intermediate goods in the Foreign
country, while A(h) and A¤ (h) involve terms related to the presence of price adjustment
costs AC
p











































H > 0 (·
p
H
¤ > 0) measure the degree of nominal rigidity in the Home (Foreign)
country and 0 · ind (ind¤
H) · 1 is the degree of indexation to previous period sector-
speci¯c in°ation. If nominal rigidities in the (domestic) export market are highly relevant
(that is, if is relatively large), the degree of inertia of Home goods prices in the Foreign





¤ = 0) and µT = µ¤
T, then optimal








25In the case of ¯rms in the nontradable intermediate sector, the labor input LN (n) is a
CES combination of di®erentiated labor inputs supplied by domestic agents and de¯ned














where L(n;j) is the demand of the labor input of type j by the producer of good n and






















Similar equations hold for ¯rms producing intermediate tradable goods. Each house-
hold is the monopolistic supplier of a labor input j and sets the nominal wage facing
a downward-sloping demand, obtained by aggregating demand across Home ¯rms. The












where the parameter ·W > 0 measures the degree of nominal wage rigidity and L is the
total amount of labor in the Home economy, while 0 · indW · 1 represents the parameter
of indexation to previous period wage in°ation in the overall economy.
A4. Households' optimization
In each country there is a continuum of symmetric households. Home households are
indexed by j 2 [0;s] and Foreign households by j 2 (s;1], the same indexes of labor
inputs. Households' preferences are additively separable in consumption and labor e®ort.
Households receive utility from consuming and disutility from working Lt hours. The

















where E0 denotes the expectation conditional on information set at date 0; ¯ is the
21See Kim (2000)
26discount factor (0 < ¯ < 1), 1=¾ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (¾ > 0)
and 1=(¿ ¡ 1) is the labor Frisch elasticity (¿ > 0), b (0 · h · 1) is the parameter of
external habit.
The budget constraint of agent j is:
Bt (j)
(1 + it)¹t
¡ Bt¡1 (j) · ¦
P
t (j) + R
K
t Kt¡1 (j) + Wt (j)Lt (j) ¡ PtCt (j) ¡ PtIt (j)
¡AC
W
t (j) ¡ TAXt (j)
Home agents hold a bond, B, denominated in the currency of the monetary union. The
short-term nominal rates it is paid at the beginning of period t and is known at time t. It is
directly controlled by the monetary authority. The bond is traded with Foreign agents. A
¯nancial friction ¹t is introduced to guarantee that net asset positions follow a stationary
process and the economy converge to a steady state.22 Home agents accumulate physical
capital which they rent to Home ¯rms at the nominal rate Rk. The law of motion is:


















Home agents own all Home ¯rms and there is no international trade in claims on ¯rms'
pro¯ts. The variable ¦P (j) includes pro¯ts accruing to Home households. Finally, Home
agents pay lump-sum (non-distortionary) net taxes TAXt (j). Similar relations hold in
the Foreign country, with the exception of the intermediation frictions in the ¯nancial
market. The Home household j chooses bond holdings, capital, investment, consumption
and wage paths to maximize its expected lifetime utility subject to budget constraint, the
capital accumulation law and the demand of labor by ¯rms. The resulting Euler equation
for consumption is:





¸t (j) = (Ct (j) ¡ bCt¡1)
¡¾ (21)
is the Lagrangean multiplies of the budget constraint. The ¯rst-order conditions with




Revenue from ¯nancial intermediation are rebated in a lump-sum way to Foreign agents. See Benigno
(2001).
27respect to It (j) and Kt (j) are standard. The ¯rst order condition with respect to Wt (j)
involves terms related to the presence of wage adjustment costs. Absent these costs,
the real (in units of domestic consumption) wage would be equal to a constant markup,
µW=(µW ¡ 1), proportional to the elasticity of substitution between labor varieties µW,











As for services, we simulate structural reforms in the labor market by permanently chang-
ing the value of µW. Greater competition and lower long-run (steady-state) markup cor-
respond to permanently higher values of µW.
A5. Public Sector
We assume that aggregate public expenditure G consists of consumption goods and is
¯nanced through net lump-sum taxes TAXt (j). For simplicity we assume that there is






















The parameter ½i (0 < ½i < 1) captures inertia in interest rate setting, while parameters
½¼ and ½GDP are respectively the weights of currency union's CPI in°ation rate ¦MU;t
and GDP GDPMU;t. The CPI in°ation rate is a geometric average of CPI in°ation rates
in the Home and Foreign country (respectively ¦t and ¦¤







The union-wide GDP is the sum of the Home and Foreign GDPs (respectively GDPt and
GDP ¤
t ), expressed in terms of Italian consumption units:




The model is closed by imposing the following resource constraints and market clearing






Ct (j)dj + Gt (26)





















































¤ = 0 (32)
A7. The equilibrium
We ¯nd a symmetric equilibrium of the model. In each country there is a represen-
tative agent and four representative sectorial ¯rms (in the intermediate tradable sector,
intermediate nontradable sector, consumption production sector and investment produc-
tion sector). The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations and prices such that, given initial
conditions and the sequence of exogenous shocks, each private agent and ¯rm satisfy the
correspondent ¯rst order conditions, the private and public sector budget constraints and
market clearing conditions for goods, labor, capital and bond hold.
29Table 1. Price and Wage Markups (Base-Case Parameters)
Parameter Italy Rest of the Euro Area
Tradables (manufacturing)
Markup µT=(µT ¡ 1) 1.17 1.17
µT 7.00 7.00
Nontradables (services)
Markup µN=(µN ¡ 1) 1.61 1.35
µN 2.65 3.90
Wages
Markup Ã=(Ã ¡ 1) 1.61 1.35
Ã 2.65 3.90
Table 2. Parameterization of Italy and the rest of the Euro Area
(Base-Case Parameters)
Rest of the
Parameter Italy Euro Area
Rate of time preference (1=¯4 ¡ 1) ¤ 100 3.02 3.02
Depreciation rate ± 0.025 0.025
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=¾ 1.00 1.00
habit h 0.70 0.70
Frisch elasticity of labor 1=(¿ ¡ 1) 2.00 2.00
Tradable Intermediate Goods
Substitution between factors of production »T 0.92 0.92
Bias towards capital ®T 0.50 0.50
Nontradable Intermediate Goods
Substitution between factors of production »N 0.92 0.92
Bias towards capital ®N 0.45 0.45
Final consumption goods
Substitution between domestic and imported goods ÁA 1.50 1.50
Bias towards Italian tradable goods aH 0.40 0.35
Substitution between domestic tradables and nontradables ½A 0.50 0.50
Bias towards tradable goods aT 0.51 0.51
Final investment goods
Substitution between domestic and imported goods ÁE 1.50 1.50
Bias towards Italian tradable goods vH 0.40 0.35
Substitution between domestic tradables and nontradables ½E 0.50 0.50
Bias towards tradable goods vT 0.51 0.51
Population size s 0.17 0.83
30Table 3. Real and Nominal Adjustment Costs (Base-Case Parameters)
Parameter (\¤" refers to rest of the Euro area) Italy Rest of the Euro Area
Real Adjustment Costs
Italian Net Foreign Asset Position
Short run dynamics ÁB1 0.05
Short run dynamics ÁB2 0.1
Investment change ÁI, Á¤
I 4.5 4.5
Nominal Adjustment Costs
Price of nontradables ·N, ·¤
N 19.25 19.25
Price of domestically-produced tradables ·H, k¤
F 70.44 70.44






i i = H;F;N 0.8 0.8
Wages indW;ind¤
W 0.8 0.8
Table 4. Euro Area Monetary Rule
Parameter Value
Lagged interest rate at (t-1) ½i 0.9
In°ation ½¦ 1.7
GDP growth ½GDP 0.4
Table 5. Steady-state National Accounts Decomposition
(Base-Case Parameters)
Italy Rest of the Euro Area
Ratio of GDP data model data model
Total Consumption 78.9 79.2 77.3 77.3
Private C 59.7 59.2 57.1 57.3
Public G 19.2 20.0 20.2 20.0
Private Investment PEI 20.7 20.8 21.1 22.7
Export EXP 25.8 26.2 - -
Imports IM 25.9 26.2 - -
Share of nontradables in Value Added 50.1 55.2
Labor income share 47.0 50.0
Net Foreign Asset Position B 0.0 0.0
Share of Euro Area GDP (percent) 17.0 18.0 83.0 82.0
Data sources: National Account data for the macroeconomic variables (1999-2006 averages).
31Table 6. Long- Run E®ects of Di®erent Italian Service Price Markups
(Base-Case Parameters)
Service Price Markup 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.25
Italy Long-Run E®ects
GDP 2.1 6.3 10.8 15.7
Consumption 1.6 4.6 7.7 11.1
Investment 3.5 10.4 18.2 27.1
Labor 1.6 4.6 7.9 11.6
Real Wages 2.4 6.9 11.9 17.4
Export Volume 1.4 4.0 6.9 9.9
Import Volume 0.4 1.0 1.7 2.5
Real Exchange Rate 2.5 7.1 12.3 18.0
Terms of Trade 1.0 2.9 5.0 7.3
Welfare steady state 0.8 2.2 3.5 4.7
Welfare transition 0.5 1.2 1.8 2.3
Rest of the Euro Area Long-Run E®ects
GDP 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.3
Consumption 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4
Investment 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2
Labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real Wages 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.4
Table 7. Long- Run E®ects of Di®erent Italian Wage Markups
(Base-Case Parameters)
Wage Markup 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.25
Italy Long-Run E®ects
GDP 1.8 5.3 9.1 12.9
Consumption 1.8 5.2 8.9 12.7
Investment 1.9 5.5 9.5 13.6
Labor 2.4 7.1 12.4 17.7
Real Wages -0.6 -1.7 -2.9 -4.1
Export Volume 2.0 6.0 10.3 14.7
Import Volume 0.5 1.5 2.6 3.7
Real Exchange Rate 0.9 2.7 4.7 6.6
Terms of Trade 1.5 4.4 7.5 10.7
Welfare steady state 0.5 1.5 2.3 3.1
Welfare transition 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.7
Rest of the Euro Area Long-Run E®ects
GDP 0.3 0.8 1.4 1.9
Consumption 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.0
Investment 0.2 0.7 1.2 1.7
Labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real Wages 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.0
32Table 8. Long- Run E®ects of Stand-Alone and Synchronized Reforms
(Base-Case Parameters)
Reforms in Italy Reforms in Italy
and the Euro Area
Wages Services Services Wages Services Services
and Wages and Wages
Italy Long-Run E®ects
GDP 9.1 10.8 20.8 10.5 11.9 23.7
Consumption 8.9 7.7 17.3 10.4 8.9 20.2
Investment 9.5 18.2 29.4 10.8 19.3 32.3
Labor 12.4 7.9 21.2 12.4 7.9 21.2
Real Wages -2.9 11.9 8.5 -1.6 13.1 11.2
Export Volume 10.3 6.9 17.8 11.2 7.6 19.6
Import Volume 2.6 1.7 4.4 6.8 5.1 12.3
Real Exchange Rate 4.7 12.3 17.4 2.6 6.1 8.8
Terms of Trade 7.5 5.0 12.9 4.1 2.3 6.5
Welfare steady state 2.3 3.5 5.1 3.7 4.7 7.7
Welfare transition 1.3 1.8 2.4 2.6 2.8 4.6
Rest of the Euro Area Long-Run E®ects
GDP 1.4 0.9 2.3 6.1 6.9 13.4
Consumption 1.4 1.0 2.4 6.1 5.3 11.7
Investment 1.2 0.8 2.0 6.0 10.8 17.5
Labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.3 4.0 9.5
Real Wages 1.4 0.9 2.4 0.8 7.4 8.2
33Table 9. Long- Run E®ects of Di®erent Italian Service Price Markups
(Lower Wage Markup)
Service Price Markup 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.25
Italy Long-Run E®ects
GDP 2.1 6.2 10.7 15.6
Consumption 1.6 4.5 7.7 11.0
Investment 3.5 10.3 18.0 26.9
Labor 1.5 4.5 7.8 11.5
Real Wages 2.4 6.9 11.8 17.2
Export Volume 1.4 4.0 6.8 9.8
Import Volume 0.4 1.0 1.7 2.4
Real Exchange Rate 2.4 7.1 12.2 17.8
Terms of Trade 1.0 2.9 5.0 7.2
Welfare steady state 0.7 1.8 2.8 3.6
Welfare transition 0.3 0.8 1.1 1.2
Rest of the Euro Area Long-Run E®ects
GDP 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.3
Consumption 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4
Investment 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.2
Labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real Wages 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.4
34Table 10. Long- Run E®ects of Di®erent Italian Service Price Markups: robustness
Parameter Baseline Á ½ ¾ ¿ » s ®
Italy Long-Run E®ects
GDP 10.8 11.2 9.0 13.6 7.6 8.5 9.9 6.9
Consumption 7.7 8.3 7.1 10.5 4.7 6.9 7.1 5.8
Investment 18.2 18.2 13.2 21.2 14.7 14.7 16.3 13.9
Labor 7.9 7.5 5.3 11.5 3.8 7.0 7.0 5.8
Real Wages 11.9 12.3 9.9 11.0 12.9 10.6 10.8 8.8
Export Volume 6.9 5.9 1.6 9.9 3.5 4.4 5.8 3.2
Import Volume 1.7 3.6 0.5 3.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.8
Real Exchange Rate 12.3 10.0 7.3 13.3 10.6 11.2 10.9 9.8
Terms of Trade 5.0 2.3 1.1 6.7 2.5 3.3 4.5 2.4
Welfare steady state 3.5 4.3 4.1 4.5 2.7 3.0 3.4 2.5
Welfare transition 1.8 2.5 2.8 2.3 1.3 2.1 1.8 1.8
Rest of the Euro Area Long-Run E®ects
GDP 0.9 0.3 0.2 1.9 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.4
Consumption 1.0 0.3 0.2 2.0 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.4
Investment 0.8 0.3 0.2 1.8 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.3
Labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real Wages 0.9 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.4
Note: the Table reports results of reducing the markup in the service sector to 1.35 by moving one
parameter at a time. The elasticity of intratemporal substitution between domestic and imported
tradable goods (Á) is changed from 1.5 to 3; the elasticity of substitution between tradable on
nontradable goods (½) from 0.5 to 1.1; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1=¾) from 1 to 2;
the labor Frisch elasticity (1=(¿ ¡ 1)) from 2 to 0.5; the elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital (») from 0.92 to 0.8; the capital weight in the production function (®) from 0.45 to 0.2 for
nontradables and from 0.5 to 0.2 for tradables; the relative size of Italy (s) from 0.17 to 0.5.
35Table 11. Long- Run E®ects of Di®erent Italian Wage Markups: robustness
Parameter Baseline Á ½ ¾ ¿ » s ®
Italy Long-Run E®ects
GDP 9.1 10.5 8.9 12.6 4.4 9.4 9.5 9.2
Consumption 8.9 10.3 8.8 12.4 4.4 9.2 9.4 9.2
Investment 9.5 10.7 9.2 13.1 4.6 10.1 10.0 9.5
Labor 12.4 12.4 12.3 16.9 6.0 12.4 12.4 12.4
Real Wages -2.9 -1.7 -3.1 -3.6 -1.5 -2.7 -2.5 -2.7
Export Volume 10.3 9.2 9.3 14.1 5.0 10.8 9.7 10.9
Import Volume 2.6 5.5 2.8 4.2 1.3 2.6 2.0 2.6
Real Exchange Rate 4.7 2.1 3.4 5.9 2.3 4.9 4.7 4.5
Terms of Trade 7.5 3.5 6.3 9.5 3.7 8.0 7.5 8.1
Welfare steady state 2.3 3.6 1.9 3.4 1.1 2.1 2.6 1.7
Welfare transition 1.3 2.5 1.0 2.0 0.7 1.5 1.6 1.3
Rest of the Euro Area Long-Run E®ects
GDP 1.4 0.5 1.3 2.7 0.7 1.2 1.7 1.3
Consumption 1.4 0.5 1.3 2.8 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.3
Investment 1.2 0.4 1.2 2.5 0.6 0.9 1.5 1.2
Labor 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real Wages 1.4 0.5 1.3 1.8 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.3
Note: the Table reports results of reducing the markup in the service sector to 1.35 by moving one
parameter at a time. The elasticity of intratemporal substitution between domestic and imported
tradable goods (Á) is changed from 1.5 to 3; the elasticity of substitution between tradable on
nontradable goods (½) from 0.5 to 1.1; the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1=¾) from 1 to 2;
the labor Frisch elasticity (1=(¿ ¡ 1)) from 2 to 0.5; the elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital (») from 0.92 to 0.8; the capital weight in the production function (®) from 0.45 to 0.2 for
nontradables and from 0.5 to 0.2 for tradables; the relative size of Italy (s) from 0.17 to 0.5.
36Figure 1a. Reduction in the service sector markup(quantities)




































































7Figure 1b. Reduction in the service sector markup (prices)




































































8Figure 2a. Reduction in the labor market markup (quantities)





































































9Figure 2b. Reduction in the labor market (prices)
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